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IMMIGRATION POLICY FROM SCRATCH:
THE UNIVERSAL AND THE UNIQUE
Stephen H. Legomsky*
Immigration, as all are surely aware, is the subject of feverish debate in countries
throughout the world. From traditionally high-immigration nations like the United
States, Australia, Canada, and Singapore to the traditionally homogeneous, low-
immigration societies of Japan and South Korea—as well as in States as different as
New Zealand, Israel, and the Member States of the European Union—governments
are actively rethinking previously sacrosanct tenets of their immigration policies.1 In
* The John S. Lehmann University Professor, Washington University School of Law, on
leave as Chief Counsel of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), U.S. Department
of Homeland Security, since October 2011. This Article was written, submitted, accepted for
publication, and posted on the Social Science Research Network before my appointment at
USCIS. The views expressed are solely in my personal capacity, not those of the agency or
department. This Article is an adaptation of speeches delivered at the Free University of
Brussels, the University of Minho in Braga, the Israeli Knesset in Jerusalem, the annual con-
ference of the Asia-Europe Meeting for the Ministers and High Government Officials of the
Asian and European States in Seoul, the Catholic University of Portugal in Lisbon, Keio
University in Tokyo, and Stetson University. I thank the organizers of all those events for their
kind invitations, and the participants for their generous and insightful feedback. Special thanks
are owed to Philippe de Bruycker, Dongwook Lee, Gonçalo Matias, Sofia Pinto Oliveira, Liav
Orgad, Amnon Rubinstein, Nobuyuki Arai, and the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliyah.
1 For the flavor of the contemporary debates in leading countries, see MIGRATION AND
GLOBALIZATION (Atsushi Kondo ed., 2008) (comparing Japan, Sweden, France, Germany,
the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States); JAMES P.
LYNCH & RITA J. SIMON, IMMIGRATION THE WORLD OVER (2003) (comparing the United
States, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan). The debates
in many of the countries mentioned above are well-captured in some of the popular media
outlets. For a sampling, see Rick Wallace, Tokyo Finally Grasps the Migration Nettle, THE
AUSTRALIAN, June 24, 2011, at 25 (explaining Japan’s new migration policies); Australia
Needs More Migrants to Boost Economy, WORKPERMIT.COM (July 10, 2006), http://www
.workpermit.com/news/2006_07_10/australia/needs_more_migrants.htm; Changes to New
Zealand Skilled Migrant Category, WORKPERMIT.COM (Feb. 1, 2008), http://www.workpermit
.com/news/2008-02-01/new-zealand-skilled-migration-changes-feb-04.htm (explaining New
Zealand’s new immigration policies); Republic of Korea Experiencing a Serious Brain Drain,
WORKPERMIT .COM (June 6, 2007), http://www.workpermit.com/news/2007-06-06/south-korea
/brain-drain-immigration-reform.htm [hereinafter Republic of Korea] (discussing the need for
new immigration policies in South Korea); Singapore Prime Minister Promotes Immigration
as Birth Rate Drops, WORKPERMIT.COM (Aug. 22, 2006), http://www.workpermit.com/news
/2006_08_22/global/singapore_needs_immigrants.htm [hereinafter Singapore Prime Minister]
(comparing Singapore’s problem of falling birth rates with other Western nations and the need
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many of those countries, the impetus for immigration reform largely reflects declining
birth rates among the native-born, aging populations, and thus a felt need for young
workers—especially professional and skilled workers.2 At the same time, those efforts
have hit a wall of social, cultural, economic, and environmental resistance. Meanwhile,
the new mobility fostered by modern advances in technology, transportation, and in-
formation have only enhanced the appeal of immigration for people adventurous and
motivated enough to stake out new lives in distant and unfamiliar lands.3 All of this
has only made the immigration issue more pressing.
In this world on the move, migration and globalization are requiring all of us to
think creatively about how to encourage, how to restrain, and how to manage interna-
tional migration. As some policymakers draft new immigration legislation from scratch
and others revisit existing law, it seems time to think generically about the overall
shape and the critical elements that make up a comprehensive immigration policy.
The premise of this Article is that there exist certain universal issues that immi-
gration policymakers in every receiving country must address, certain decisions that
will always have to be made. In saying this, I appreciate that the countries of the world
come in vastly different shapes and sizes. They have different histories, cultures, forms
of government, social structures, economic realities, age and labor demographics,
values, and ultimately even different missions. All of these national attributes, and
others, rightly influence a nation’s immigration policy.
Several disclaimers, therefore, are required. First, I make no claim of completeness.
No doubt there are additional universal issues or decisions. Second, conversely, there
will always be additional issues that are not universal—issues that are unique to the
host country. Third, I stress that I am positing only universal questions, not universal
answers. How a country chooses to resolve these issues will reflect all the relevant
characteristics that make the country distinctive.
This Article, then, provides a kind of immigration policy checklist or roadmap.
It is offered as a starting point for anyone involved in either the formulation or the
wholesale alteration of a country’s immigration policy. Reflecting my perception of
the key pieces of the immigration puzzle and how they fit together, this Article urges
a comprehensive approach. This means simultaneously addressing not only the nar-
row question of who should be admitted into the country’s territory, but also several
other subjects that are joined at the hip—citizenship, integration, illegal immigration,
and expulsion.
for increased immigration). Israel is currently contemplating the first comprehensive immigra-
tion legislation in its history. SHLOMO AVINERI ET AL., MANAGING GLOBAL MIGRATION: A
STRATEGY FOR IMMIGRATION POLICY IN ISRAEL 9, 17 (Ruth Gavison ed., Naftali Greenwood
trans., 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/SoL3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1576647.
2 See, e.g., Republic of Korea, supra note 1; Singapore Prime Minister, supra note 1.
3 See John Samuel & Susan George, Globalization, Migration and Development, 29 CAN.
STUD. POPULATION 31, 34, 36 (2002).
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I. THE PRELIMINARIES: DEFINING THE MISSIONS
A visionary immigration policy demands some conscious philosophical choices.
Policymakers need to think hard about what they see as the missions—and I use the
plural deliberately—of their immigration policy. At the highest level of generality, is
the goal solely to maximize the overall welfare of the country’s existing and future
citizens, as is often assumed? Or, is there a moral obligation to take into account the
interests of the prospective immigrants as well? Finally, what if those two sets of in-
terests conflict? On these moral questions there is no consensus.4
But even an exclusive focus on the national welfare of the receiving State and
its citizens leaves multiple, sometimes conflicting, missions to reconcile. These re-
quire prioritization.
Consider, for example, the economic goals. Are the main objectives the growth
and vibrancy of the economy, the equitable distribution of economic resources, the
labor market, the nation’s fiscal health, or the international balance of trade?5 More-
over, how does one estimate and balance the effects of immigration on consumer
prices, industry strength, and worker protection?
Aside from the economy, how much weight should be assigned to the nation’s
physical security?6 How much emphasis should there be on population size—does the
nation want to expand its population, reduce it, or maintain the status quo, and how
4 See, e.g., Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV.
POL. 251, 253 (1987) (arguing for equal weight on the immigration interests of citizens and
noncitizens); Stephen Macedo, The Moral Dilemma of U.S. Immigration Policy: Open Borders
Versus Social Justice?, in DEBATING IMMIGRATION 63, 63–64 (Carol M. Swain ed., 2007)
(contending that a country’s moral obligations to its own poor citizens exceed any owed to
poor noncitizens); John A. Scanlan & O.T. Kent, The Force of Moral Arguments for a Just
Immigration Policy in a Hobbesian Universe, in OPEN BORDERS? CLOSED SOCIETIES? 61,
78–82 (Mark Gibney ed., 1988) (arguing that moral issues are not only relevant to immigration
policymaking, but consistent with the national interest).
5 As to the impact of immigration on the U.S. economy, the most rigorous and compre-
hensive study to date is NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., THE NEW AMERICANS (James P. Smith & Barry
Edmonston eds., 1997). For opposing views on the labor market effects of immigration, compare
GEORGE J. BORJAS, HEAVEN’S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY
10–11 (1999) (fearing that immigration of low-wage workers adversely affects their native
counterparts), with Howard F. Chang, Migration as International Trade: The Economic Gains
from the Liberalized Movement of Labor, 3 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 371 (1998)
(seeing overall positive effects on the labor market).
6 Compare, e.g., Mark Krikorian, Keeping Terror Out: Immigration Policy and Asymmetric
Warfare, 75 NAT’L INT. 77 (2004) (attributing the 9/11 attacks to lax U.S. immigration policy),
with David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution’s Blind Spot, 113
YALE L.J. 1753 (2004) (refuting the link between immigration controls and terrorism, and
emphasizing human rights constraints).
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much priority does that issue command?7 To what extent is cultural preservation a
critical component of the mission?8 Is diversity a national goal, and if so, what kind?9
Is one of the missions of an immigration policy the safeguarding of democratic and
constitutional ideals?10 Is it family reunification? Is it the advancement of human rights
and the protection of individuals and groups from persecution, torture, or other harms?
Symbolically, what statement should a country’s immigration policy make to its own
people and to the world, about the nation’s basic values and self-identity?
II. CITIZENSHIP
Citizenship (or nationality)11 policy is inseparable from immigration policy. For one
thing, international law recognizes a legal right to enter and remain in one’s country
of nationality.12 For another, laws commonly confer special immigration privileges on
specified family members of the country’s citizens.13 Ideally, therefore, policy deci-
sions in each of these spheres should reflect policy decisions in the other.
7 See, e.g., ELLEN PERCY KRALY, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1995)
(exploring the relationships among immigration, population, and the environment); see also
supra note 1.
8 One well-known immigration restrictionist argues strongly that immigration policy must
protect the nation’s cultural core and that, in the United States, that cultural core is European
and not Latino. PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION 58–73 (1995). For persuasive refutations, see
Kevin R. Johnson, Fear of an “Alien Nation,” 7 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 111, 111–12 (1996);
Peter H. Schuck, Alien Rumination, 105 YALE L.J. 1963 (1996) (reviewing BRIMELOW, supra).
9 See PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA 123–31, 324 (2003) (praising diversity
and acknowledging government’s legitimate role in promoting it, but opposing government
efforts to “create or promote any particular kind of diversity”).
10 In the context of the European debate over integration as a condition of admission, see
infra notes 122–25 and accompanying text. Liav Orgad argues that any cultural objectives of
an immigration policy should be framed narrowly as a reference to the immigrant’s acceptance
of the host country’s governance and constitutional values. Liav Orgad, Illiberal Liberalism:
Cultural Restrictions on Migration and Access to Citizenship in Europe, 58 AM. J. COMP. L.
53, 84–86, 88–89, 93, 96–99 (2010).
11 The laws of some countries distinguish citizenship from nationality. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1401(d), 1408, 1436 (2006) (United States); INTERNATIONAL IMMIGRATION AND NATION-
ALITY LAW, at MEX-24 (Dennis Campbell ed., 2d ed. 2012) (Mexico). In this summary
discussion, I use the two terms interchangeably.
12 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 12, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173 (prohibiting arbitrary denial of right to enter own
country); cf. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 13(2), G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right . . . to return to his country”).
13 See, e.g., Christine Adam & Alexandre Devillard, Comparative Study of the Laws in
the 27 EU Member States for Legal Immigration, Eur. Parl. Doc. PE 393.281 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf_study_of_laws_for_legal_immigration.pdf
(containing individual country reports prepared by the International Organization for Migration
at request of European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs); 
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Countries have to decide, among other things, which events will generate citizen-
ship at the moment of birth. The traditional divide is between the principles of jus
soli, which bestows citizenship on individuals born in the country’s territory, and jus
sanguinis, under which a person inherits the citizenship of one or both parents.14 Prac-
tically every country confers citizenship at birth based on some form of jus sanguinis,
but the precise requirements vary widely from country to country; they go back differ-
ing numbers of generations and often depend on whether the citizen parents had re-
sided in the country for a specified number of years before the birth of the citizenship
claimant.15 In contrast, only some countries, mainly in the Americas, offer birthright
citizenship based on a pure form of jus soli.16 Most countries today, including the
United States, use some combination of the two.17
Citizenship later in life—i.e., naturalization—raises hard questions as well. Again,
the requirements vary widely. In particular, how long should one have to reside in the
country in order to be eligible for naturalization?18 Should the applicant be required
to renounce, or at least take an oath purporting to renounce, other citizenships?19
Stephen H. Legomsky, Rationing Family Values in Europe and America: An Immigration
Tug of War Between States and Their Supra-National Associations, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
807 (2012); Lori A. Nessel, Families at Risk: How Errant Enforcement and Restrictionist
Integration Policies Threaten the Immigrant Family in the European Union and the United
States, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1271 (2008).
14 Ayelet Shachar, Children of a Lesser State: Sustaining Global Inequality Through
Citizenship Laws 4–5 (Jean Monnet Program, Working Paper No. 2/03, 2002).
15 There are too many variations to summarize here. For more detailed accounts of the
citizenship policies of forty-two leading countries, see the citizenship sections of the individual
country chapters in INTERNATIONAL IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW, supra note 11.
16 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (United States); 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2006)
(United States); INTERNATIONAL IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW, supra note 11, at
ARG-17 to 18 (Argentina); id. at MEX-24 (Mexico, but offering only nationality upon birth
in the country and deferring citizenship until age 18); id. at VEN-28 to 29 (Venezuela). Outside
of the Americas, jus soli is rare but not unknown. See, e.g., id. at AUS-46 to 48 (Australia, until
1986); id. at NZ-25 to 26 (New Zealand).
17 See Shachar, supra note 14, at 7.
18 In the United States, for example, the usual requirement is five years of continuous
residence after admission for lawful permanent residence, 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2006), with
some exceptions, including a relaxation of the requirement to three years for one who is
married to and living with a U.S. citizen, 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a) (2006). At the other end of the
spectrum, Switzerland imposes a combination of national, cantonal, and municipal require-
ments for naturalization. INTERNATIONAL IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW, supra note
11, at SWI-45 to 48.
19 That distinction is important, because the world’s nations vary widely in their willingness
to give effect to their citizens’ renunciation oaths. For a good compilation, see Charles Roth,
Worldwide Liberalization of Dual Citizenship Rules and Potential Side Effects on U.S.
Citizenship, 83 INTERPRETER RELEASES 2529, 2530 & app. I (2006). The United States, for
example, requires a naturalization applicant to take an oath renouncing all foreign allegiances,
8 U.S.C. § 1448(a)(2) (2006), but does not require the person to follow through. Germany,
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Subject to any applicable treaties,20 every sovereign State decides who are, and who
are not, its own nationals;21 thus, no State has the power to decide whether an individ-
ual may acquire or retain the citizenship of another State. But nothing prevents a State
from conditioning its own citizenship on the person renouncing other States’ citizen-
ships. As a result, a country’s decision whether to make renunciation a prerequisite to
naturalization will reflect its degree of tolerance for dual nationality.22
Just as expulsion is the flip side of the admission coin,23 so too is revocation of
citizenship the flip side of the granting of citizenship. Apart from flaws in the origi-
nal naturalization process, what should be the criteria for taking away someone’s
citizenship?24 In particular, should it require the individual’s consent, or are there
circumstances in which a country’s laws should permit the revocation of citizenship
against the will of the individual?25 If the latter, should a demonstrated lack of alle-
giance be enough, and if so, what should the government be required to prove?26 This
question has special relevance in an age of terrorism. In addition to criminal or other
sanctions, should there be citizenship consequences when a person plans, perpe-
trates, or assists terrorist acts against his or her own country?
Finally, though beyond the scope of the present article, exactly which legal
rights and duties should be linked to citizenship? A wide spectrum of political, social,
and economic rights, as well as obligations relating to taxation and military service,
might be reserved exclusively for citizens, extended to noncitizen residents, or fur-
ther extended to a wider range of individuals with various legal or physical ties to
the country.27
in contrast, conditions naturalization upon actual renunciation of all foreign nationalities.
INTERNATIONAL IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW, supra note 11, at GER-16. For a
forceful argument against requiring a renunciation oath, see Gerald L. Neuman, Justifying
U.S. Naturalization Policies, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 237, 268–77 (1994).
20 The most significant modern convention displaying broader acceptance of dual nation-
ality is the European Convention on Nationality, Nov. 6, 1997, E.T.S. No. 166.
21 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws
arts. 1–2, Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 91.
22 See, e.g., RANDALL HANSEN & PATRICK WEIL, DUAL NATIONALITY, SOCIAL RIGHTS
AND FEDERAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE (2002); RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF DUAL
NATIONALS (David A. Martin & Kay Hailbronner eds., 2003); Linda Bosniak, Multiple National-
ity and the Postnational Transformation of Citizenship, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 979 (2002); Peter J.
Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 1411 (1997).
23 See infra Part IV.C.
24 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (2006).
25 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not permit the government
to strip a person of U.S. citizenship involuntarily. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 270 (1980).
Congress has since codified that decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (2006).
26 For a thoughtful discussion of this question, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories of
Loss of Citizenship, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1471 (1986).
27 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Citizens’ Rights and Human Rights, 43 ISR. L. REV. 67 (2010).
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III. THE ADMISSION OF NONCITIZENS
A. Numbers
Numbers matter. How many immigrants should the country admit? Variables in-
clude the country’s needs and absorptive capacity.28 Depending on how one feels about
the previous issue—that is, whose interests count?—the numbers decision might also
reflect the demand side of the equation. The country’s own absorptive capacity will
depend on such demographic variables as the expected mortality rates, fertility rates,
and rates of immigration and emigration—as related to the existing population, the
foreseeable future immigrant population, and the descendants of both.29 The question
of optimum numbers also depends on the nation’s physical geography, including its
natural resources and environment, as well as the present and expected future state of
the country’s infrastructure.30 The numbers question might further require economic
modeling, in addition to forecasting the likely degree of the public’s cultural tolerance,
and thus the prospects for successful integration.31
Perhaps the hardest questions, however, are not “how many?,” but “which ones?”
In most prosperous countries, the demand for immigrant admissions exceeds the num-
ber that the nation is willing to take in.32 When that is the case, countries have to make
the most basic policy decision known to immigration law: who should get priority over
whom? The next three subsections discuss the three groups of people who have tradi-
tionally received preference in immigrant selection: the families of the country’s exist-
ing citizens and residents; individuals with valuable occupational skills; and refugees.
B. Family Reunification
The most numerous of the lawfully admitted immigrants in Europe,33 the United
States,34 and worldwide35—have been those who immigrate for the purpose of family
28  Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Equality and Diversity, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 319, 323 (1993).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Shelly Wilcox, Immigrant Admissions and Global Relations of Harm, 38 J. SOC. PHIL.
274, 275 (2007).
33 PIETER BOELES ET AL., EUROPEAN MIGRATION LAW 9 (2009).
34 Family reunification accounted for approximately two-thirds of all legal immigration to
the United States in fiscal year 2010. RANDALL MONGER & JAMES YANKAY, ANNUAL FLOW
REPORT: U.S. LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENTS: 2010, at 1 (2011), available at http://www
.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/lpr_fr_2010.pdf. This does not even count the
spouses and children accompanying or following to join immigrants who are admitted under
the non-family programs. Id. at 3, tbl.2.
35 See CHRISTINA BOSWELL & ANDREW GEDDES, MIGRATION AND MOBILITY IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION 103 (2011); Orgad, supra note 10, at 57–58.
346 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 21:339
reunification. There are many issues here: which family relationships should qualify?
Nuclear family? Extended family?36 What about immigration based on non-traditional
relationships, such as same-sex marriages, polygamous marriages, and non-marital
intimate relationships? Europe outpaces the United States on those family issues,
though not on some others.37 Whichever relationships are recognized, should the same
preferences that apply to family members of citizens also apply to the family members
of its lawfully resident noncitizens?38 As to the latter, should the requirements be more
stringent for family relationships that are formed after the admission of the principal
immigrant (described in some countries as “family formation”) than for preexisting
family members (often described as “family reunification”)?39
36 In the European Union, for example, Member States are required to admit all direct de-
scendants of an EU citizen and of the EU citizen’s spouse if those descendants are either under
age 21 or dependent, as well as dependent ascendant relatives. Council Directive 2004/38,
art. 1–2, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77 (EC) [hereinafter Free Movement Directive] (declaring the right
of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory
of the Member States). The analogous Directive governing the admission of the family mem-
bers of resident third country nationals does not require the admission of the extended family.
Council Directive 2003/86, pmbl., para. 10, 2003 O.J. (L 251) 12 (EC); id. at art. 4.3. United
States law authorizes the admission of the parents and siblings of adult U.S. citizens but makes
no other provision for extended family. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1153(a)(4) (2006).
37 In the United States, the family reunification provisions do not extend to unmarried
couples. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b), 1153(a), 1153(d) (2006). Similarly, same-sex marriages are not
recognized for immigration (or any other federal) purposes. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)). In contrast, the immi-
gration laws of at least eight EU Member States admit unmarried partners. Adam & Devillard,
supra note 13, at 59 & n.109 (listing “Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Lithuania, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Sweden, and the UK”). The laws of at least three of those States, Finland, the
Netherlands, and the U.K., explicitly admit same-sex partners, whether or not married. Id. at
59 & n.110. Subsequent spouses in polygamous marriages are not recognized by either U.S.
law or EU law. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10)(A) (excluding anyone coming to the United States to
practice polygamy); Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)) (defining marriage as a union of “one man and one woman”);
Council Directive 2004/38, art. 2(a), 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77 (EC) (applying to spouses of EU
citizens); Council Directive 2003/86, art 4.4, 2003 O.J. (L 251) 12 (EC) (applying to spouses
of lawfully resident third country nationals).
38 Under U.S. law, the family members of U.S. citizens are treated far more favorably than
the analogous family members of lawfully admitted resident noncitizens. Preference is ac-
corded to the spouses, parents, married and unmarried sons and daughters, and siblings of U.S.
citizens. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1153(a)(1), (3), (4) (2006). (8 U.S.C. § 1153 (a)(2)
(2006) gives preference to only spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of lawfully admitted
resident noncitizens.) In the EU, there are separate directives spelling out the admission require-
ments for the family members of EU citizens, Council Directive 2004/38, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77
(EC), and those of lawfully resident third country nationals, Council Directive 2003/86, 2003
O.J. (L 251) 12 (EC).
39 The Netherlands once attempted to impose more stringent income support requirements
in cases of family “formation” (i.e., marriages following sponsor’s admission) than in cases
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Should there be waiting periods for family unification, either express or de facto,
such as those resulting from numerical limits or from qualitative restrictions that take
time to satisfy? In the United States, the waiting periods generated by statutory quotas
are several years long for some of the family reunification categories.40 Mandatory
waiting periods are less common in the EU, but they are not unknown and are gaining
in popularity.41 For spouses, should there be special rules or procedures to minimize
marriage fraud?42
Should there be additional eligibility requirements for family members? Pre-
admission language requirements or more general pre-admission integration tests
are increasingly deployed in Europe, and they are discussed below.43 Should there be
financial support requirements?44
of family “reunification” (preexisting marriages). In Chakroun v. Minister van Buitenlandse
Zaken, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that (except for refugees) the State
may not treat those two classes of family members differently. Case C-578/08, Chakroun v.
Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2010 E.C.R. I-1839 (Mar. 4, 2010), available at http://curia
.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=82677&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN
&mode=1st&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2001387. United States law allows the admission
of spouses and children “accompanying or following to join” specified immigrants, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153(d) (2006), but the regulations make clear that this provision applies only to spouses and
children acquired before the admission of the principal immigrant, 22 C.F.R. § 42.53(c) (2012).
40 See 9 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VISA BULL. No. 34, at 2 (2011) [hereinafter VISA BULL.]
(listing waits of generally seven years for unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens, ten
years for married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens, eleven years for siblings of adult U.S.
citizens, and over three years for the spouses and unmarried minor children of lawful permanent
residents—in each case, longer still for immigrants from certain high-volume source countries).
41 Austria and Estonia have put express numerical limits on total immigration, including
family immigration. Adam & Devillard, supra note 13, at 39–40. Several EU Member States
have adopted various forms of mandatory waiting periods for family immigration. See id. at
175 (Cyprus), 198–99 (Denmark), 213 (Estonia), 242 (France), 268 (Greece), 283 (Hungary),
332 (Lithuania), 341 (Luxembourg), 349–50 (Malta), 374 (Poland), 433 (Spain); Report
from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Application of
Directive 2003/86/EC on the Right to Family Reunification, at para. 4.3.5, COM (2008) 610
final (Oct. 8, 2008) [hereinafter European Commission Report 2008] (listing Cyprus, Estonia,
Greece, and Lithuania).
42 Regarding the United States, see Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986,
8 U.S.C. § 1186a (2006) (establishing “conditional” permanent resident status for certain
spouses and children and imposing additional restrictions). The laws of several EU Member
States expressly exclude fraudulent marriages and forced marriages. See Adam & Devillard,
supra note 13, at 134 (Austria), 213 (Estonia), 360 (Netherlands). Some require DNA evi-
dence of the family relationship. Nessel, supra note 13, at 1273 & n.10.
43 See infra notes 122–25 and accompanying text.
44 United States law excludes any noncitizen who is deemed “likely at any time to become
a public charge,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A) (2006), and for this purpose requires legally binding
affidavits of support from family members’ U.S. sponsors, 8 U.S.C. § 1183(a) (2006). Financial
support requirements are also standard in the EU Member States. European Commission Report
2008, supra note 41, para. 4.3; Adam & Devillard, supra note 13, at 60–61.
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What about the family members of those who are admitted only on a temporary
basis—e.g., students, guest workers, business visitors, and so on? Should those family
members be admitted, and if so, on what terms? Should they be allowed to work?
Should their right to remain terminate when the family relationship terminates, or
when the principal admittee leaves the country?45
In order to answer these and other family questions, policymakers have to iden-
tify their reasons for having a family reunification program in the first place. Is fam-
ily reunification mainly a humanitarian project, designed to avoid the hardship of
separation? Is it a human rights concept, meant to satisfy international legal obliga-
tions?46 Is it a way to foster the integration of immigrants? Is it a practical alternative
to illegal immigration?
At the same time, what is the impact of a country’s family migration policies on
the ethnic composition of the resulting society? Does an emphasis on family migra-
tion affect the overall occupational skill levels of immigrants? Does it add social and
economic networks? Will it increase or decrease remissions or otherwise affect the
international balance of trade?
C. Labor Immigration
A second major component of many countries’ immigration policies is labor
migration. Again, there are several issues: does the country want or need labor immi-
grants in the first place, and if so, how can the program be structured so as to balance
and protect the legitimate interests of industry, labor, and consumers? In particular,
how should the law minimize foreign workers’ competition with native workers for
job opportunities? What measures will prevent employers from exploiting immigrant
workers, using them to depress wages or working conditions of domestic labor, or
otherwise violating foreign workers’ human rights?
More concretely, should labor immigrants be admitted as temporary guest workers,
permanent residents, or both? There is a large divide among the major immigrant-
receiving countries on this issue. In Canada, Australia, and the United States, labor
45 In the United States, noncitizens who are admitted for temporary periods of time are
called “nonimmigrants.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2006). For the terms of admission of the
various categories of nonimmigrants, see 2 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 12.01 (2011).
46 The more general international human rights of migrants have been the subject of a vast
literature. See, e.g., RICHARD B. LILLICH, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1984); Joan Fitzpatrick, The Human Rights of Migrants, in MIGRATION
AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS 169 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Vincent Chetail eds.,
2003); David Weissbrodt, The Protection of Non-Citizens in International Human Rights Law,
in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 221 (Ryszard Cholewinski et al. eds., 2007). The European
Court of Human Rights has been extremely active in applying the European Convention on
Human Rights to family reunification. See BOELES ET AL., supra note 33, at 141–78.
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immigrants can theoretically be admitted as permanent residents from the outset.47
In practice, Australia has recently moved toward temporary labor migration,48 and, in
the United States, the annual numerical ceilings result in substantial waiting periods
for most of the permanent resident subcategories.49 Those waiting periods, combined
with the reluctance or inability of employers to hold jobs open for several years, often
make it more realistic for labor immigrants to enter the United States initially as tem-
porary workers50 and adjust their status to permanent residence years later.51 In con-
trast, the laws of most European countries expressly admit labor immigrants only for
temporary residence and require stays of a specified number of years before granting
permanent residence.52
If labor immigrants are admitted as temporary guest workers, for how long a
period should they be allowed to stay, should those periods be renewable, and what
should be the end game? If they can seek permanent residency at some stage, what
should that stage be, and what eligibility criteria should be applied? If there is no op-
portunity for eventual permanent residence, then how does the law ensure that guest
workers actually leave the country when their time is up, and is the human impact of
removing workers who have formed meaningful bonds within the community mor-
ally acceptable? It was several European countries’ heavy reliance on guest workers
in the 1960s and 1970s53 that prompted the famous observation by Swiss scholar Max
Frisch: “We sought workers, and human beings came.”54
What criteria should be used in selecting labor immigrants? In the United States,
the selection of labor immigrants for permanent residence is based mainly on whether
a particular employer has an immediate need for the services of a particular individual
that cannot be met by U.S. workers.55 To document that need, the employer generally
must obtain “labor certification,” which requires showing that “there are not sufficient
workers who are able, willing, qualified . . . and available” to perform the work and
that the employment will not “adversely affect the wages and working conditions” of
American workers.56 For temporary workers, U.S. law prescribes analogous conditions,
47 See Adam & Devillard, supra note 13, at 46. Regarding the United States, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153(b) (2006).
48 See Jock Collins, Australian Immigration Policy in the Age of Globalization, in
MIGRATION AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 1, at 161, 171–73.
49 VISA BULL., supra note 40.
50 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H) (2006).
51 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006).
52 Adam & Devillard, supra note 13, at 46.
53 Collins, supra note 48, at 171.
54 “Man hat Arbeitskräfte gerufen, und es kommen Menschen.” MAX FRISCH, SCHWEIZ
ALS HEIMAT? 219 (1990), reprinted in STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ,
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 371 (5th ed. 2009).
55 See Employment-Based Immigrant Visas, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov
/visa/immigrants/types/types_1323.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2012).
56 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A) (2006). There are exceptions. For example, noncitizens with
“extraordinary ability” in specified fields, “outstanding” professors and researchers, and
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so as to diminish competition with the U.S. domestic labor force.57 Two prominent
U.S. scholars have criticized the current structure, objecting not only to the slow and
cumbersome bureaucracy it has required, but also to the very premise of selecting
permanent residents on the basis of employers’ transitory needs.58
Some other countries use points systems designed to predict the immigrant’s
likely long-term contributions to the host society generally and to the economy in
particular.59 Points might be awarded for such factors as youth, education, knowledge
of the host country’s language, and work experience. Canada and Australia have gone
that route,60 while Germany and the United States recently considered, but ultimately
rejected, proposed points systems.61 Also, should the focus be on professional or other
skilled workers—as is contemplated, for example, by the “blue card” program in the
European Union62—or is there a need for unskilled workers as well? Should there be
annual numerical ceilings on the admission of workers?63
D. Refugees
Refugees comprise a third major category of admissions. Here there are two broad
kinds of programs to distinguish. In an offshore program, a country agrees in advance
certain multinational executives and managers are exempted from these requirements. See
id. § 1153(b)(1)(A)–(C) (defining the first employment-based preference category); id.
§ 1182(a)(5)(A) (applying the labor certification requirement only to other employment-based
preference categories). In addition, the requirement may be waived for certain subcategories
of employment-based immigrants “in the national interest.” Id. § 1153(b)(2)(B).
57 See id. §§ 1101(a)(15)(H), 1101(a)(15)(O), 1101(a)(15)(P) (laying out categories of
eligible temporary workers); id. § 1182(n) (requiring “labor condition applications” from
employers for admission of certain professional workers).
58 DEMETRIOS PAPADEMETRIOU & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, BALANCING INTERESTS 37–94
(1996) (arguing that temporary needs are best served by temporary workers and that permanent
residence for labor immigrants should be based on a points system aimed at predicting long-
term contributions).
59 See, e.g., RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32235, U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY ON PERMANENT ADMISSIONS 17 (2009).
60 See Mary Liston & Joseph Carens, Immigration and Integration in Canada, in
MIGRATION AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 1, at 207, 210 (describing Canadian points
system); Visas, Immigration and Refugees: Professionals and Other Skilled Migrants,
AUSTRALIAN DEP’T IMMIGR. & CITIZENSHIP, http://www.immi.gov.au/skilled/general-skilled
-migration/points-test.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2012) (describing the Australian points system
for skilled labor immigrants).
61 See S. 1639, 110th Cong. § 502 (2007) (introduced June 18, 2007) (proposing points
system as element of comprehensive U.S. immigration reform package); Wolfgang Bosswick,
Immigration Policy in Germany, in MIGRATION AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 1, at 107,
128 (explaining the political compromise that ultimately doomed the German points system).
62 Council Directive 2009/50, 2009 O.J. (L 155) 17–18 (EC) (concerning conditions of entry
and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment).
63 United States law numerically caps certain subcategories of temporary workers. See
8 U.S.C. § 1184(g) (2006).
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to accept a certain number of overseas refugees and, perhaps, to transport them into
its territory for permanent resettlement.64 Since 1980, the United States has operated
a large overseas refugee resettlement program,65 but only a handful of other countries
have followed the U.S. lead.66 In contrast, an onshore program is one in which a person
arrives at the frontier or in the interior—on his or her own—and applies for protection.67
These are commonly called asylum programs.68 A country formulating an immigration
policy might consider both offshore and onshore refugee programs.
A preliminary decision is whether to ratify the 1951 U.N. Refugee Convention, as
amended by the 1967 U.N. Refugee Protocol, if the country has not already done so.69
As of April 1, 2011, 147 States were parties to either the original Convention or the
Protocol or both.70 As discussed below,71 the Convention defines the term “refugee”
and lays out certain refugee rights that the States Parties are obliged to respect.72
The major substantive question is whom the country wishes to protect, and from
what. There are, first of all, people who qualify as refugees under the Refugee Conven-
tion, as having a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”73 This Con-
vention definition reaches millions of individuals, but it is still narrow and technical.
The Convention Against Torture, as its name implies, protects individuals from torture
and related harms.74 But what about those who are fleeing from other dangers, such as
the crossfire of a civil or international war, or environmental disaster, or other national
or regional emergencies? They might not be able to demonstrate persecution or torture,
64 See, e.g., Fact Sheet 60—Australia’s Refugee and Humanitarian Program, AUSTRALIAN
DEP’T IMMIGR. & CITIZENSHIP, http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/60refugee.htm (last
visited Dec. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Fact Sheet 60].
65 See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 109 (1980) (repealed 1994).
66 GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 500
& n.213 (3d ed. 2007).
67 See, e.g., Seeking Protection in Australia, AUSTRALIAN DEP’T IMMIGR. & CITIZENSHIP,
http://www.immi.gov.au/visas/humanitarian/_pdf/seeking-protection-in-australia.pdf (last
visited Dec. 6, 2012); Fact Sheet 60, supra note 64.
68 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006).
69 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [herein-
after Refugee Convention], amended by Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31,
1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Refugee Protocol].
70 U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, STATES PARTIES TO THE 1951 CONVENTION RELAT-
ING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL 1, available at http://www.unhcr
.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf (last visited Dec. 6, 2012).
71 See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
72 Refugee Convention, supra note 69, art. 1, § A, amended by Refugee Protocol, supra
note 69, art. 1.2.
73 Id.
74 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 3.1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113 (defining torture and prohibiting
return “to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be
in danger of being subjected to torture”).
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but their lives or welfare might nonetheless be in peril. Those situations frequently pre-
sent themselves in the context of mass influxes rather than individual arrivals, and thus
create special challenges for the receiving States.75 Should the nation offer a safe haven
to any of those classes of individuals?76 If so, should protection be limited to those who
have already arrived and wish only to remain, or should the program extend to indi-
viduals who are overseas and seek admission?77 And for any of these dangers, should
the law confine its protection to the person who has physically left his or her country
of origin, or should the program also cover individuals internally displaced within
their home countries?78
Should even those individuals who clearly need protection be denied it for reasons
of national security or public safety, or because they forfeited their moral claims for
protection by personally persecuting others?79 When should the State deny protection
75 See, e.g., Michael Clemens, Crossing Borders to Escape Natural Calamities Is No Easy
Option, GUARDIAN (Aug. 23, 2012, 7:56 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development
/poverty-matters/2012/aug/23/crossing-borders-escape-natural-calamities.
76 In the United States, the Secretary of Homeland Security has the authority to grant
“temporary protected status,” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (2006), to the nationals of countries experienc-
ing armed conflict, environmental disaster, or other “extraordinary and temporary conditions”
that prevent safe return, id. § 1254a(b)(1), provided that certain other conditions are met, includ-
ing continuous physical presence in the United States since a date specified by the Secretary of
Homeland Security, id. § 1254a(c)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). Analogous schemes sprouted up in Europe
after the Yugoslav crisis of the early 1990s. See GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 66,
at 340 & n.393. The relevant EU instrument is Council Directive 2001/55, 2001 O.J. (L 212)
12 (EC), concerning “minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass
influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member
States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof.” African nations have
gone further, granting full “refugee” status to those fleeing armed conflict. Jean-François
Durieux & Agnès Hurwitz, How Many Is Too Many? African and European Legal Responses
to Mass Influxes and Refugees, 47 GER. Y.B. INT’L L. 105, 115–25 (2004).
77 In the United States, the statute makes clear that the program is limited to individuals al-
ready present, and then only if they have been present since a date specified by the Secretary
of Homeland Security. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006); id. § 1254a(c)(5) (2006).
International practice varies. See, e.g., GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 66, at 341.
78 The international definition of “refugee” does not include the internally displaced. Refugee
Convention, supra note 69, art. 1, § A(2) (requiring that the person be “outside the country of
his nationality” or, if stateless, “outside the country of his . . . habitual residence”). However,
the United Nations has taken steps to protect internally displaced persons. See GOODWIN-GILL
& MCADAM, supra note 66, at 481–88 (summarizing the international measures); Francis
Mading Deng, The Global Challenge of Internal Displacement, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 141
(2001) (describing the U.N. role from the point of view of the former Special Representative to
U.N. Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons); Walter Kälin, Introduction to The
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 10 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 557 (1998) (summarizing
general framework for internally displaced persons). In contrast, the U.S. refugee definition
expressly includes the internally displaced. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2006).
79 The Refugee Convention excludes individuals who have engaged in specified serious
misconduct from all the protections afforded by the Convention, Refugee Convention, supra
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on the ground that the particular applicant should be someone else’s problem, or be-
cause he or she has already found a safe harbor, or should have found a safe harbor,
somewhere else?80
When protection is granted, what form should it take? Should it be limited to what
international lawyers call “non-refoulement,” meaning not returning the person to the
particular country in which he or she fears harm?81 When should the law permit return
to a safe third country?82 When should protection take the broader form of affirmatively
allowing the person to remain in the territory of the destination country?83 When that
permission is granted, for how long should the person be allowed to remain—only
until the danger subsides, or permanently? Is there a point at which the right thing to
do is to give up on the possibility of repatriation and grant a right of permanent resi-
dence so that the refugee can begin to rebuild his or her life? If so, what is that point?84
What civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights should refugees have?85 What
should be the rules for admission of the person’s family members?86
note 69, art. 1.F, and further denies those who have committed certain other bad acts the spe-
cific right not to be returned to the country of persecution, id. art. 33, § 2.
80 See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of
Asylum Seekers to Third Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection, 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE
L. 567 (2003) (providing a revised version of the consultant’s report to the U.N. High Comm’r
for Refugees on the permissibility of returning refugees to third countries through which they
have passed en route).
81 Non-refoulement is the most basic protection required by the Refugee Convention,
supra note 69, art. 33. The analogous provision of U.S. law is 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2006)
(restriction on removal).
82 See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 80.
83 This is the remedy commonly known as “asylum.” See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006)
(using the term “asylum” in that way).
84 On this question, national practices differ widely. Some jurisdictions, including Hong
Kong, accept refugees on the understanding that they must leave once the opportunity to resettle
safely elsewhere presents itself. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 66, at 551–53. In the
United States, refugees may generally be granted permanent residence status one year after
admission under either the overseas refugee program or asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1159 (2006).
85 The Refugee Convention requires States to recognize a variety of rights, including non-
discrimination, religious freedom, access to court, work permits, education, welfare, labor laws,
and free movement within the country. Refugee Convention, supra note 69, arts. 3, 4, 16, 17,
22–24, 26–28. For an exhaustive study of refugee rights, see JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE
RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
86 Several European instruments require “respect for . . . family life” or similarly require
countries to admit the family members of third-country nationals generally (not just refugees).
See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8,
Sept. 3, 1970, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, amended by Protocol No. 3, E.T.S. 45, Sept. 21, 1970, and
Protocol No. 5, E.T.S. 55, Dec. 20, 1971; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
art. 7, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 389 (“respect for . . . family life”); id. art. 9 (“right to
marry and . . . to found a family”); id. art. 24 § 3 (child’s “right to maintain on a regular basis
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Because asylum claims can take a long time to decide,87 another issue is what sorts
of reception conditions should be in place while the person’s asylum claim is pending.
For example, should the person be allowed to work? Should the country provide pub-
lic assistance when it is needed for basic living expenses?88 Under what circumstances
should asylum seekers be detained?89
Finally, what kinds of procedures do these refugee status determinations require,
both overseas and at home? On the one hand, the vital individual interests at stake de-
mand procedures that realistically permit careful, accurate, and consistent decision-
making. On the other hand, there are the realities of finite resources, manipulation of
the system, and the importance of avoiding long delays. In particular, should the in-
quiries be adversarial or inquisitorial?90 What appellate or review mechanisms should
be available?91 Should legal aid be offered to indigent asylum applicants, during either
 a personal relationship and direct contact with both his or her parents”); id. art. 33 § 1 (family’s
“legal, economic and social protection”); Free Movement Directive, supra note 36, pmbl. para.
2. These instruments, and the interpretations of their respective treaty bodies, are well-discussed
in BOELES ET AL., supra note 33, at 72–74, 161–205. United States law expressly provides for
the admission of the spouses and children of both those admitted under the offshore refugee
program and those granted asylum. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157(c)(2), 1158(b)(3) (2006).
87 See, e.g., The US Immigration Court System: Workload and Due Process Challenges,
CTR. MIGRATION STUD. (Feb. 21, 2012), http://cmsny.org/2012/02/21/osuna-on-us-immigration
-court-system/.
88 The EU rules appear in Council Directive 2003/9, 2003 O.J. (L 31) 18 (EC), establishing
minimum standards for receiving asylum seekers. In the United States, work authorization is
expressly prohibited during the first 180 days in which an asylum application is pending, 8
U.S.C. § 1158(d)(2) (2006), and there is no provision for welfare eligibility before asylum has
been granted, Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-93, §§ 401(a), 431(b), 110 Stat. 2105.
89 Calling the detention of asylum seekers “inherently undesirable,” the office of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees urges a “presumption against detention” and calls for limit-
ing detention to certain specified necessities. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, UNHCR’s
Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers
1, 3–4 (1999), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3c2b3f844.pdf. The United
States, nonetheless, routinely detains asylum seekers in a broad range of situations. Stephen H.
Legomsky, The Detention of Aliens: Theories, Rules, and Discretion, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 531, 543–49 (1999) (distinguishing categorical determinations from individualized
adjudication); Michele R. Pistone, Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied: A Proposal for Ending
the Unnecessary Detention of Asylum Seekers, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 197, 247–62 (1999)
(analogizing to pre-trial detention in criminal cases).
90 For a thoughtful study, see David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On
Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1368–69 (1990) (proposing an
inquisitorial, interview-based system).
91 The EU rules require every Member State to assure a “right to an effective remedy before
a court or tribunal” against a decision on an asylum application. Council Directive 2005/85,
art. 39, 2005 O.J. (L 326) 31 (EC) [hereinafter Procedures Directive] (outlining minimum
standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status). In the
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the initial phase or any subsequent phases?92 Are special accelerated procedures war-
ranted for particular categories of cases?93
E. Geography
Family reunification, labor immigration, and refugees might be the three main
pillars of a typical immigration policy, but policymakers have additional admission
priorities to resolve. One of them is especially sensitive: what role, if any, should cul-
tural and geographic variables like race, ethnicity, religion, and country or region of
origin play in the selection of immigrants?
The most conspicuous way to regulate the geographic origins of a country’s immi-
grant population is to build explicit preferences for particular countries’ nationals into
the law. These provisions are common features of modern immigration laws, as nations
form regional associations based on historical or contemporary ties. The European
Union is the clearest and most powerful example, but other associations of nations with
reciprocal immigration preferences include the South American trade pact known as
MERCOSUR94 and the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement between Australia and
New Zealand.95 NAFTA96 contains provisions that ease the rules for the movement
of certain business travelers among Canada, the United States, and Mexico; the same
is true for the seventeen countries currently participating in the Business Travel Card
United States, the asylum procedures vary depending on whether the initial application is filed
before or during removal proceedings, but in either case, there is ultimately a right of appeal to
an administrative tribunal and a further right of judicial review, subject to numerous exceptions.
DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES §§ 1.8–1.10 (2011); LEGOMSKY
& RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 54, at 1029–85.
92 Subject to several limitations, the EU rules mandate the provision of free legal assistance
upon the request of an asylum applicant. Procedures Directive, supra note 91, art. 15. U.S. law,
in contrast, contains no analogous provision.
93 See, e.g., ANKER, supra note 91, § 1:7 (describing U.S. expedited removal procedure);
Maryellen Fullerton, Inadmissible in Iberia: The Fate of Asylum Seekers in Spain and Portugal,
17 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 659 (2005) (critiquing Spanish and Portuguese accelerated asylum
procedures); David A. Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal in the New Immigration
Laws, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 673, 703–04 (2000) (defending same); Michele R. Pistone & John J.
Hoeffner, Rules Are Made to Be Broken: How the Process of Expedited Removal Fails Asylum
Seekers, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 167, 210–11 (2006) (criticizing fairness and accuracy of U.S.
expedited removal process).
94 See Brazil: New Immigration Program for Citizens of MERCOSUR Countries, GLOBAL
IMMIGR. NEWS (Nov. 15, 2009), http://totallyexpat.com/global-immigration-news/brazil-new
-immigration-program-for-citizens-of-mercosur-countries/.
95 Visas, Immigration and Refugees: New Zealand Citizens Entering Australia, AUSTRALIAN
DEP’T IMMIGR. & CITIZENSHIP, http://www.immi.gov.au/allforms/travel-documents/new-zealand
.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2012).
96 North American Free Trade Agreement, ch. 16, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993),
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/naftatce.asp.
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arrangement of the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).97 United States law
exempts both tourists and business visitors from the usual visa requirements if they
are nationals of certain countries with low rates of visa denials and visa abuse.98 Many
Muslim countries have been generous in offering temporary protection to Muslim
refugees.99 Israel has a special Law of Return designed to provide a safe haven for
Jews.100 Germany, Turkey, and Japan have (or previously had) programs specifically
for ethnic Germans,101 ethnic Turks,102 and ethnic Japanese,103 respectively.
It is possible to achieve similar effects indirectly. A country’s immigration cri-
teria might be country-neutral on their face but more (or less) realistically attainable
by nationals of particular countries or regions. Thus, Australia’s infamous, and now
defunct, White Australia policy required fluency in European languages that Chinese
laborers and South Pacific Islanders were unlikely to speak.104 Alternatively, a coun-
try might award points for fluency in its own language.105 Or, as some EU Member
States have recently done, it might adopt a so-called integration-abroad requirement
that bars the foreign spouses of its citizens or residents unless they can speak the
country’s language.106
The United States historically had various laws that explicitly excluded most
East Asian immigrants,107 and from 1921 to 1965 the United States operated under a
national origins quota system.108 This regime prescribed different annual limits for
97 Atsushi Kondo, New Challenges for Managing Immigration in Japan and Comparison
with Western Countries, in MIGRATION AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 1, at 15, 25 & n.2.
98 8 U.S.C. § 1187 (2006).
99 See Legomsky, supra note 80, at 590 (describing Muslim refugee flows to Pakistan, Iran,
the former Soviet Central Asian Republics, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria, Lebanon,
Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq).
100 Law of Return 5710-1950, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org
/jsource/Immigration/Text_of_Law_of_Return.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2012).
101 Bosswick, supra note 61, at 128.
102 Zeynep Kadirbeyoglu, Changing Conceptions of Citizenship in Turkey, paras. 14.2.2,
14.5, available at CITMODES, UNIV. EDIN. SCH. OF L., http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/citmodes
/files/turkey.pdf (last visited Dec. 6, 2012) (“exceptional acquisition” of Turkish nationality
for individuals of Turkish descent).
103 Kondo, supra note 97, at 25–26.
104 Accounts can be found in Fact Sheet 8—Abolition of the ‘White Australia’ Policy,
AUSTRALIAN DEP’T IMMIGR. & CITIZENSHIP (Oct. 2012), http://www.immi.gov.au/media
/fact-sheets/08abolition.htm; White Australia Has a Black History, NAT’L LIBR. AUSTL. STAFF
PAPERS (1995), http://www.nla.gov.au/openpublish/index.php/nlasp/article/view/960/1235
(written and presented at the Indigenous Research Ethics Conference, 27–29 Sept. 1995).
105 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
106 See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
107 Classic historical accounts are JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND (2d ed. 2002);
MILTON R. KONVITZ, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW (1946); RONALD
TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE (1989).
108  The Acts, from earliest to the most recent, include: Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, § 2(a),
42 Stat. 5 (introducing numerical quotas for first time); Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190,
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different immigrant source countries, and it did so for the admitted purpose of mini-
mizing the admission of southern and eastern Europeans, mainly Jews and Catholics.109
History has not looked kindly upon those laws. In 1965, Congress replaced these na-
tional origins quotas with a single, uniform limit on the number of immigrants who
may be admitted in a single year from a single country.110 That change eliminated the
explicit discrimination against natives of particular countries, but even a uniform per-
country limit still subjects two otherwise similarly situated individuals to different
waiting periods depending on whether their countries of origin send many or few im-
migrants to the United States. Thus any per-country limit, even if uniform, affects the
ethnicity of the resulting population. The United States’ “visa lottery” operates in a
like manner.111 After a series of ad hoc programs to admit immigrants from countries
and regions that have sent relatively few immigrants to the United States in recent
years,112 Congress in 1990 enacted permanent legislation for the admission of so-called
“diversity immigrants.”113
Finally, even a facially geography-neutral law that places a high priority on family
reunification significantly affects the country’s ethnic makeup. Because recent im-
migrants will naturally be those most likely to have close family members overseas,
prioritizing family reunification reinforces preexisting immigration patterns, thus
influencing the resulting population mix.114
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, a country that wants to inject ethnic, ra-
cial, religious, or linguistic selectivity into its admissions policy has ways of doing so.
The question for every nation is whether this is a good idea. Is cultural homogeneity,
or alternatively is the replication of a country’s historical or contemporary ethnic
mix, a valid national goal? Conversely, is diversity a valid national goal, and if so,
what kinds?115
§ 11(a)–(b), 43 Stat. 153, 159 (modifying the quota formula and making the national origins
system permanent); Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911, 911–12 (repealing
the national origins quota system).
109 GORDON ET AL., supra note 45, § 2.02[2]; HIGHAM, supra note 107, at 265–72.
110 Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 2, 79 Stat. 911, 911–12.
111 See About Green Card Lottery, U.S.A. GREEN CARD LOTTERY, http://www.usagreen
cardlottery.org/about-green-card-lottery.jsp (last visited Dec. 6, 2012).
112 See Immigration Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-658, § 3, 102 Stat. 3908,
3908–09; Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 314, 100 Stat.
3359, 3439.
113 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 132, 104 Stat. 4978, 5000 (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c) (2006)).
114 See STEPHEN C. LOVELESS ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN CITIES
19–45 (1996); Joseph A. Rodriguez, Assessing and Predicting the Impact of Immigration on
Communities, H-URBAN (1997) (reviewing LOVELESS, supra), http://www.h-net.org/reviews
/showrev.php?id=858.
115 See SCHUCK, supra note 9, at 123–31.
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F. Temporary Visitors
Aside from selecting permanent residents, immigration policymakers have to
decide whom to admit for temporary periods. The usual categories include tourists,
students, business visitors, temporary workers, and a variety of others, which could in-
clude journalists, diplomats, airline crews, and the like.116 Decisions include not only
which categories to admit, but also what specific eligibility requirements to impose,
whether to prescribe numerical limits, how long each class of temporary visitors should
be allowed to stay, what restrictions to place on their activities, including the conditions
for allowing employment, and what sorts of visa regimes and other procedures to put
in place.117
G. Exclusion Grounds
Apart from requiring certain positive credentials for each category of either perma-
nent residents or temporary visitors, countries have to decide what factors will be dis-
qualifying. Typical exclusion grounds relate to criminality, national security, inability
to support oneself financially, public health, abuse of the immigration system itself, or
simply the lack of essential documents.118 Few will quibble with these general concepts,
but the devil is in the details, and those details can generate some difficult issues. Pre-
cisely which crimes, or categories of crimes, will be grounds for exclusion? Will admis-
sibility depend on the number of crimes committed, their classification as felonies or
misdemeanors, the potential or actual sentences, the individual’s age, or the timing of
the offenses? How serious must be the threat to national security before that ground be-
comes applicable, and how can the law be articulated so as not to chill civil liberties?
What income levels will be required? Which diseases, if any, will disqualify someone?
What types of fraud should the system be designed to detect? Will these various exclu-
sion grounds apply with equal force to individuals seeking permanent residence and
those seeking only temporary stay or residence? Under what circumstances will admin-
istrative officials be authorized to grant discretionary waivers of the various exclusions?
116 Probably the most elaborate set of temporary visitor categories is that of the United States.
The U.S. statute lays out twenty-two categories of “nonimmigrants” and breaks down most of
them into subcategories, each with different conditions of stay. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2006).
The State Department regulations dissect those subcategories into even finer subcategories.
22 C.F.R. § 41.12 (2012).
117 See, e.g., RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31381, U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY ON TEMPORARY ADMISSIONS 1 (2011) (noting the “policy tensions” surrounding these
decisions in the United States).
118 In the United States, all these exclusion grounds are enumerated in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)
(2006). The exclusion grounds adopted by each of the EU Member States are described through-
out Adam & Devillard, supra note 13. Nationals of EU Member States and their family mem-
bers, however, may be denied admission to other EU Member States only on narrow grounds.
See Free Movement Directive, supra note 36, art. 27, § 1 (allowing exclusion only “on grounds
of public policy, public security or public health”).
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H. Admission Procedures
Once admission criteria are adopted, what procedures should be created to imple-
ment them?119 Who should be required to obtain visas, and precisely what documen-
tation should those individuals have to present? What will be the role of immigration
inspectors at ports of entry, both for individuals who have visas and for any who are
exempted from that requirement? Will informal interviews, formal hearings, or both
be available for people who are initially turned away at ports of entry? Will there be
any formal appellate or review process by a specialized administrative tribunal, court
of general jurisdiction, or both?
IV. OTHER DECISIONS
A. Integration
In my view, a successful immigration policy necessarily includes a comprehensive
plan for integrating immigrants into the host society—economically, culturally, politi-
cally, linguistically, and in all other essential respects. Policymakers have to decide not
only how to implement a plan for integration, but also what integration means. The
latter inquiry requires decisions about multiculturalism. How much space should in-
tegration mechanisms leave for immigrants to retain their own cultural practices when
those practices differ from fundamental traditions or values of the host society? In
Europe, the debate over wearing Islamic veils in schools or other public places ex-
emplifies this tension,120 but the debate goes well beyond veil laws, to a broad range
of cultural practices.
What specific elements should a comprehensive integration plan contain? In
particular, what provision should be made for reuniting immigrants with their over-
seas family members?121 How should the government encourage language instruction
and facilitate access to it? Do the efforts by several European governments to bar
access of family members until they have learned the country’s language122 facilitate
or impede integration? To justify pre-entry language requirements for family mem-
bers, governments have generally touted the benefits of easing the family members’
social, cultural, and economic integration into the host society.123 Opponents have
emphasized the practical obstacles to pre-entry language acquisition, the resultant
119 Asylum and other refugee status determinations require special procedures. See supra
notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
120 See generally JOHN R. BOWEN, WHY THE FRENCH DON’T LIKE HEADSCARVES (2007).
121 See supra Part III.B.
122 See Kees Groenendijk, Pre-Departure Integration Strategies in the European Union:
Integration or Immigration Policy?, 13 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 1, 3–4 (2011).
123 See id. at 14 (describing Germany’s rationale); Bernard Ryan, Integration Rules in
Immigration and Nationality Law: The Case of the United Kingdom, CTR. FOR MIGRATION
L. 3, 8 (2010), http://www.kent.ac.uk/law/research/documents/ryan-UK-final-1.pdf.
360 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 21:339
delays in family reunification, and the deleterious effects on the integration of the
immigrant sponsors.124 Should the government offer, or support efforts by the private
sector to offer, job training? To what extent should immigrants be eligible for public
assistance? Is eventual naturalization expected? Are there other things the host country
can do, and which are in its interest to do, that would help immigrants and their families
understand and adapt to critical cultural and democratic norms? Should a specialized
government agency for immigrant integration be created?125 If integration is to succeed,
it should be a two-way street. Policymakers need to decide not only how to encourage
immigrants to adapt to their new country, but also what kind of public education cam-
paign about immigration and integration would benefit the host society.126
B. Illegal Immigration
Legal immigration aside, policymakers today need to estimate the extent and im-
pact of illegal immigration and decide what policy responses are appropriate. Elsewhere
I have attempted a more detailed examination of this large subject127 and thus will con-
fine the present discussion to a brief outline of the issues and the solutions commonly
adopted or proposed.
The starting point is to assess the magnitude of the problem. This entails not only
empirical investigation of the size, demographics, and tangible effects of illegal immi-
gration (both positive and negative), but also subjective value judgments concerning
the seriousness of those effects. A sense of proportion is critical. Has the phenomenon
caused, or is it about to cause, the kind of crisis that demands draconian measures? Or,
are the practical effects modest enough that less muscular responses are sufficient?
124 BOSWELL & GEDDES, supra note 35, at 109; Groenendijk, supra note 122, at 25–27
(urging the importance of family reunification despite capacity concerns).
125 Portugal, known throughout Europe for its successful integration of immigrants, has cre-
ated a government agency to create and administer its integration programs. Lucinda Fonseca
et al., Migration Policy Grp., Portugal, in CURRENT IMMIGRATION DEBATES IN EUROPE 1,
25–28 (Jan Niessen et al., eds., 2005), http://www.migpolgroup.com/public/docs/141.EMD
_Portugal_2005.pdf. These address issues of education, criminality, naturalization, health,
housing, and free Portuguese language courses. Id.
126 For thoughts on the two-way nature of the integration project in the U.S. context, see Juan
F. Perea, “Am I an American or Not?” Reflections on Citizenship, Americanization, and Race,
in IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 49, 65 (Noah M.J. Pickus
ed., 1998) (arguing that American immigration policies should be reframed as a “reciprocal
and mutual process of accommodation, rather than a one-way process of assimilation by
immigrants”); Cristina M. Rodríguez, Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a Theory of
What Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219, 247–57.
127 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits of the Undocumented Immigrant, 44 GA. L. REV.
65 (2009) [hereinafter Legomsky, Portraits] (relating fictional debate between scholars with
polar opposite views on illegal immigration); Stephen H. Legomsky, The Removal of Irregular
Migrants in Europe and America, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MIGRATION AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (Vincent Chetail ed., forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Legomsky, Removal].
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The typical policy options either actually implemented or proposed can be thought
of as falling into four categories. The most common set of approaches can be grouped
under the heading of enforcement. These include border apprehensions, through such
means as increased border patrol personnel,128 physical barriers,129 and more sophis-
ticated border technology;130 interior enforcement, such as prohibitions on hiring
unauthorized workers,131 workplace raids,132 employer audits,133 counterfeit-resistant
immigration and identification documents,134 national identity cards of the type that
predominate in Europe,135 and an electronic database of authorized workers.136 A sec-
ond set of strategies includes limited amnesties (which by definition would forgive the
violations and withhold punishment) and legalizations (which would impose fines or
other penalties as a condition of eligibility).137 A third set of strategies, advocated by
anti-immigrant organizations, has been dubbed “self-deport[ation].”138 Recognizing
128 See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 101, 110 Stat. 3009-546; Douglas S. Massey, Beyond the Border
Buildup: Towards a New Approach to Mexico-U.S. Migration, IMMIGR. DAILY, http://
www.ilw.com/articles/2006,0109-massey.shtm (last visited Dec. 6, 2012) (showing that
enhanced border enforcement since 1986 has coincided with reduced apprehension rates
and increased immigration).
129 Act of Aug. 13, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-230, 124 Stat. 2485; see Massey, supra note 128.
130 Act of Aug. 13, 2010, 124 Stat. 2485.
131 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006).
132 On April 30, 2009, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security
Investigations (HSI) division established a revised worksite enforcement method. It focused on
criminal prosecutions against employers that, among other activities, used unauthorized workers
in their business model. In the 2011 fiscal year, HSI authorized more than 700 criminal arrests
based on related investigations. Fact Sheet: Worksite Enforcement, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT (May 23, 2012), http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/worksite.htm.
133 Julia Preston, Illegal Workers Swept from Jobs in ‘Silent Raids,’ N.Y. TIMES, July 10,
2010, at A1.
134 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, § 104, 110 Stat.
at 555–56.
135 Within the European Union, residents of Member States are authorized to cross the border
of a Member State upon presenting a valid passport or residence permit issued by a Member
State. Commission Recommendation Establishing a Common ‘Practical Handbook for Border
Guards (Schengen Handbook)’ to Be Used by Member States’ Competent Authorities when
Carrying Out the Border Control of Persons § I.3, COM (2006) 5186 final (Nov. 6, 2006).
136 For example, E-Verify is a government-maintained electronic database designed to store
the names and social security numbers of all individuals—U.S. citizens and noncitizens alike—
who are authorized to work in the United States. E-Verify, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR.
SERVICES, http://www.dhs.gov/e-verify (last visited Dec. 6, 2012). The origins of E-Verify
are in the Basic Pilot Program mandated by IIRIRA. See Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, §§ 401–404, 110 Stat. at 655–65.
137 See S. 1639, 100th Cong. § 601(a), (e)(5) (2007) (providing for a $1500 penalty for
applying for immigration status).
138 See Legomsky, Portraits, supra note 127, at 103 & n.102 (describing the policy, “attrition
through enforcement,” advanced by the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS)).
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the near impossibility of locating, apprehending, and removing an entire population by
physical force, they aim to make the lives of undocumented immigrants so unsustain-
able that they will return home on their own.139 A final set of strategies might attempt
to deter illegal immigration by offering positive alternatives, such as helping to stimu-
late the economies of major source countries,140 encouraging improvement of human
rights conditions in major source countries, enforcing domestic labor laws so as to
diminish employer incentives to exploit—and therefore to hire—unauthorized labor,
and expanding the opportunities for legal immigration under family reunification and
labor migration programs.141
C. Expulsion
The flip side of the admission coin, and one of the policy responses to illegal
immigration, is deportation. What should the grounds for deportation be?142 What
circumstances justify exceptions to those grounds, or at least the possibility of discre-
tionary waivers?143 And importantly, what procedures should deportation require? For
example, should there be formal hearings, appeals, or a right of judicial review?144
139 See generally Kris W. Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach
to Illegal Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 153 (2008) (advocating attrition
through enforcement).
140 In recent years, the combination of a worsening U.S. labor market and a growth in job
opportunities in Mexico has drastically reduced the volume of illegal immigration into the
United States. Damien Cave, Better Lives for Mexicans Cut Allure of Going North, N.Y. TIMES,
July 6, 2011, at A1.
141 See generally Legomsky, Portraits, supra note 127; Legomsky, Removal, supra note 127.
142 In the United States, the grounds for removing noncitizens from the interior appear in 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a) (2006), and fall into roughly the same categories as the analogous exclusion
grounds in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2006). In the EU, each Member State has its own removal
grounds, but for irregular migrants the EU has adopted some common ground rules. See
Council Directive 2008/115, 2008 O.J. (L 348) 98 (EU) [hereinafter Return Directive] (estab-
lishing common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying
third-country nationals).
143 The U.S. statute contains numerous waiver provisions that generally authorize dis-
cretionary relief from specified removal grounds in specified circumstances, such as long-
term presence, family separation, or other unusual hardship. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006)
(asylum); id. § 1182(h) (waiver of certain criminal grounds); id. § 1182(i) (waiver of fraud
grounds); id. § 1229b (cancellation of removal); id. § 1255 (adjustment of status). In the EU,
the Return Directive simply authorizes relief “for compassionate, humanitarian or other
reasons.” Return Directive, supra note 142, art. 6, § 4.
144 In the United States, the general removal process includes a quasi-formal, adversarial,
evidentiary hearing before an executive branch official known as an “immigration judge.” See
8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006). Either the noncitizen or the government may appeal to an admin-
istrative tribunal called the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3) (2012).
The noncitizen also has a right to petition for review in the relevant U.S. Court of Appeals, al-
though the availability of judicial review is now subject to broad exceptions. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)
(2006). The individual EU Member States generally have their own removal procedures, but
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Under what circumstances will individuals be detained during all or part of the removal
process?145 Should there be a right to counsel for some or all cases, and if so, should the
government ever be required to supply counsel to indigent individuals in deportation
proceedings—for example, those in which the individual is a permanent resident or
seeks asylum?146 Are there circumstances in which accelerated or other exceptional
deportation procedures are warranted?147 What adaptations will be made in cases where
national security concerns are present?148 When will otherwise deportable individuals
be allowed to depart voluntarily in lieu of removal?149
D. Who Decides?
Superimposed on all the issues discussed to this point—and anterior to resolving
them—is the “who decides?” question. This question has several dimensions. If the
country is part of one or more larger associations such as the European Union or the
Council of Europe, what is the optimal allocation of power between the supranational
association and the individual Member States?150
the Return Directive guarantees a right of appeal or review. Return Directive, supra note 142,
art. 15.
145 U.S. law makes liberal use of pre-removal detention. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 89,
at 533–35. EU law, in contrast, allows detention only for the purpose of carrying out the removal
of an individual who impedes return or is at risk of absconding. Return Directive, supra note 142,
art. 15. Even then, there must be no less coercive means, there must be a “reasonable prospect
of removal,” and specified procedural safeguards must be provided. Id.
146 In the United States, a noncitizen in removal proceedings has a statutory right to counsel,
but not at the government’s expense. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b)(4)(A), 1362 (2006). In the EU, access
to legal assistance is required in asylum cases. Return Directive, supra note 142, art. 13.
147 The United States has established several special accelerated removal procedures; the most
important is expedited removal, which ordinarily takes place at ports of entry but, in certain lim-
ited circumstances, may also be utilized in the interior. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2006). Many
of the EU Member States have also adopted accelerated removal procedures, particularly for
irregular migrants apprehended in the border areas. Evaluation of EU Readmission Agreements,
at 12, COM (2011) 76 final (Feb. 23, 2011).
148 U.S. law makes a number of adjustments in national security cases, most of them adopted
in specific response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra
note 54, ch. 10 (summarizing special procedures designed specifically for immigration cases
that potentially present national security issues). In sharp contrast, the EU’s Return Directive
offers few exceptions relating to national security. See, e.g., Return Directive, supra note 142,
art. 7, § 4 (authorizing Member States to avoid granting voluntary departure when a person
poses a national security risk); id. art. 12.1 (excusing Member States from giving reasons for
return decisions to safeguard national security).
149 EU law strongly encourages voluntary departures in lieu of forcible returns. Return
Directive, supra note 142, pmbl. para. 10, art. 7. U.S. law grants a circumscribed discretion
to allow voluntary departure in specified circumstances, which vary depending on the stage of
the proceeding. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2006).
150 See generally BOELES ET AL., supra note 33 (examining the ways in which the European
States have assigned the various immigration-related responsibilities).
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Whichever decisions the country chooses to reserve for itself, how will the powers
be allocated internally? That inquiry, in turn, has multiple components. If the country
is a federation, how should immigration policy discretion and implementation be ap-
portioned as between the national government and its political subdivisions? The U.S.
Supreme Court has long held that the federal government has the exclusive power
to regulate immigration,151 but drawing a clear line between regulating immigration
and regulating the daily lives of immigrants has proved challenging, and today the
state-federal division of immigration policy in the United States is the subject of vig-
orous debate.152 In some other federations, immigration policymaking is shared by
the national government and its political subdivisions.153
Whether a State is federal or unitary, every democracy will have to make some
key separation of powers decisions. How should immigration policy discretion be
allocated between the legislative and executive branches—in presidential systems of
government, in Westminster-type parliamentary systems, and in other types of parlia-
mentary democracies?154 In practical terms, this entails determining which decisions
should be embodied in statutes and which ones should be left to administrative regu-
lations or other governmental pronouncements.
Finally, within the executive branch, how should the agencies that perform the
various functions be organized? Should immigration be assigned to the department
in charge of justice or home affairs, to the department that regulates labor, to the
State Department or Foreign Affairs Ministry, or to the department responsible for
national security? Moreover, should all the immigration functions reside in the same
151 Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889);
Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876).
152 For commentary favoring a broad state role in regulating immigration, see Cristina M.
Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567
(2008); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
57; Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J.
INT’L L. 121 (1994). For commentary urging more limited state involvement, see Gerald L.
Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal
Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425 (1995); Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related
State and Local Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement,
2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27 (arguing that state, county, and local ordinances regulating general
immigration are unconstitutional on federal preemption grounds in the context of immigration
and nationality); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration
Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001) (arguing for height-
ened judicial scrutiny of state action in the immigration context).
153 See, e.g., Liston & Carens, supra note 60, at 207, 213–14; Bosswick, supra note 61,
at 107, 131–32.
154 Generally, parliaments have delegated far more policy discretion to their respective gov-
ernments than has the U.S. Congress, which has filled the governing statute with minutely
detailed rules. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS
IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 259–61 (1987).
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department or unit, or is it better to disperse the officials in charge of service, enforce-
ment, and adjudication?155
E. Country-Specific Twists
Supplementing the universal issues are the country-specific variety. The latter
issues might be unique, or they might be shared by some other nations. Thus, every
Member State of the European Union faces issues that arise out of the principles of
freedom of movement, Schengen’s abolition of internal borders, and the common
delegations of power to central EU authorities.156 Former colonial powers might feel
special obligations, and thus offer preferential immigration privileges to the current
nationals of their former colonies.157
Many nations are unique or at least distinctive in still other ways. Countries such
as the United States, Australia, and New Zealand might stand out as attractive because
their economies are dramatically better than those of most—or all—of their regional
neighbors.158 Some countries stand out because of geography. Their locations make
them convenient destinations for immigrants and asylum seekers. Examples include
countries situated on the periphery of the European Union.159 Still other countries might
be desirable destinations because they are democracies surrounded by autocratic States
155 In the United States, the various immigration functions were reorganized in the wake of
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Today, the functions that could be roughly classified
as service, border enforcement, and interior enforcement are lodged in three different govern-
ment agencies, though all are within the Department of Homeland Security: U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 72 Fed. Reg. 20,131, 20,131 (Apr. 23, 2007). Formal adju-
dication takes place within a separate agency, the Executive Office for Immigration Review,
situated in the Department of Justice. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0 (2012).
156 See generally BOELES ET AL., supra note 33 (discussing evolving trends in European
migration after the formation of the EU).
157 See, e.g., Adam & Devillard, supra note 13, at 384, 390 (describing the Portuguese
government’s preferential treatment for nationals of Cape Verde and Brazil).
158 See generally World Factbook: Country Comparison: GDP—Per Capita (PPP), CENT.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder
/2004rank.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2012) (listing gross domestic product per capita on a pur-
chasing power basis of each nation).
159 See, e.g., Reinhard Marx & Katharina Lumpp, The German Constitutional Court’s
Decision of 14 May 1996 on the Concept of ‘Safe Third Countries’—A Basis for Burden-
Sharing in Europe?, 8 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 419, 434–38 (1996) (describing disproportionate
reception of asylum seekers by countries of southern and eastern Europe). Today, the south-
ern European countries voice particular concerns over the arrivals of North Africans fleeing
the tumultuous conditions arising out of the Arab Spring. See, e.g., Sabina Castelfranco,
Italian Island Crowded by North African Refugees, VOICE OF AM. (Mar. 4, 2011), http://
www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Italian-Island-Crowded-by-North-African-Refugees
-117464783.html (describing arrivals on Italy’s Lampedusa Island).
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that deprive their populations of basic human rights. A State such as Israel shares some
of these characteristics and has the additional distinction of having been founded spe-
cifically as a safe haven for Jews, a mission that immensely complicates its immigration
policy decisions.160
CONCLUSION
After this whirlwind tour of the major issues that immigration policymakers the
world over have to address, the question remains: what does it all add up to? On the one
hand, universal issues abound. In resolving them, policymakers everywhere can learn
valuable lessons from both the successes and the failures of other countries’ experi-
ences. On the other hand, whether issues are universal or host country–specific, their
resolutions necessarily reflect the country’s own distinctive characteristics—its his-
tory, missions, culture, values, national ethos, economy, and security. Subject to human
rights and other international legal constraints, these are the kinds of decisions that only
the nation’s own people, acting through their elected leaders, have the moral standing
to make.
As they train one eye on the prodigious long-term practical consequences of the
immigration policy that they construct, policymakers should train the other eye on the
symbolic effects. An immigration law makes an announcement: it says “these are the
people we will welcome as our fellow residents and neighbors; those are the people
we will not.” In making that statement, an immigration law acts as a mirror. It reflects
the qualities that we value or reject in others. For the same reason, immigration policies
supply a litmus test. They offer the world a glimpse into our souls, an insight into what
we truly believe.
160 Avineri et al., supra note 1, at 10.
